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Securitisation, a financial practice that appeared in the 
1960s and peaked in the run up to the global financial 
crisis of 2008, is nowadays presented by policymakers as 
a promising tool to revive a sluggish European economy 
by channelling funding from capital markets to firms, 
notably Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs). It 
entails pooling contractual debt, such as mortgages, auto 
loans or credit card loans, and selling the related cash 
flow to investors in the form of securities. The European 
Commission has made a proposal for a new regulatory 
framework for securitisation (the Securitisation 
regulation), as a first building block of its Capital Markets 
Union (CMU), trying to balance two objectives: creating 
growth and jobs and ensuring financial stability. 
However, some of the proposed criteria to identify 
“Simple, Transparent and Standard (STS) Securitisations” 
are raising doubts, as is the proposed mechanism for 
supervision. Finally, there seems to be no guarantee that 
the proposal will channel funds mostly to innovative 
SMEs, but rather again to residential loans. This Policy 
Brief reviews the rationale for regulating the practice, 
and some of the main questions arising from the 
Commission’s legislative proposal. 
 
From the shadows to the spotlight: the case for 
regulating securitisation 
 
Securitisation, a financial practice that was mostly 
unknown beyond the relatively limited circles of finance 
until 2008, had its 15 minutes of fame when it allegedly 
triggered the biggest financial crisis the United States and 
the world had known since the Great Depression.  
 
What is securitisation? It is a funding technique for banks, 
which consists in converting exposures such as loans to 
households and SMEs into tradable securities that they 
can sell to investors on capital markets. Concretely, the 
loans are sold to an ad hoc structure – a Special Purpose 
Entity (SPE) – that finances their purchase through the 
emission of tradable securities on capital markets. The SPE 
then collects payments of interests and principal on the 
loans, or receivables, and distributes this cash flow to the 
investors. For banks, securitisation aims both at raising 
capital on the market in order to meet their regulatory 
capital requirements (the amount of highly liquid assets 
they must hold in order to face liabilities in periods of 
stress), and to reduce those very same requirements by 
shifting some of the risky assets off their balance sheet. 
Indeed, when loans are securitised, the investors, not the 
bank, bear the risk of non-repayment (the ‘credit risk’). 
The cash that the bank kept as provision is thus freed and 
can be used to extend new loans. For investors, this 
technique creates new financial instruments into which 
they can invest their money.  
 
Executive Summary 
> With its proposal for an EU regulation on 
securitisation, the European Commission tries to 
strike a balance between the funding 
opportunities that this financial practice could 
bring and the specific risks that it entails.  
> The proposed regulation would introduce a 
differentiated, advantageous, prudential 
treatment for securitisations that are “simple, 
transparent and standardised”. In this way, it tries 
to deal with some of the most pressing issues 
identified with securitisation during the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2008. 
> However, the proposed regulation still presents 
shortcomings and uncertainties, leaving doubts as 
to its capacity to boost investments and avoid risky 
practices. 
> While aiming at re-orienting financing towards 
SMEs, employment and growth, the proposed 
framework is unlikely to actually bring significantly 
higher funding to firms, and could fuel real-estate 
bubbles. 
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Presented in this way, securitisation may look like a good 
idea for all parties involved. However, as Verena Ross, 
Executive Director of the European Securities Market 
Authority (ESMA) sums it up in a recent hearing in the 
European Parliament (2016): “As a funding tool, it 
(securitisation) can contribute to a well-diversified funding 
base. As a risk transfer tool, it can also act to improve 
capital efficiency and allocate risk to match demand (…) on 
the other hand, it is also recognized that when not 
properly used, securitisation can become a significant 
destabilising factor.” In the run up to the financial crisis of 
2008, in the US but also in Europe, poor standards 
governing the selection of underlying assets led mortgage 
lenders to issue loans to ever riskier borrowers and to 
households ever more unlikely to repay – the infamous 
‘subprime’ mortgages. This ‘credit risk’ was assumed to be 
mitigated, since all loans were backed by the borrowers’ 
houses. However, banks and investors, on the basis of 
inadequate models, wrongly assumed that prices on the 
housing market would keep rising so that even in case of 
non-repayment of the loans, the losses could still be 
absorbed by seizing and selling the houses. Even if the 
houses were to lose value, securitisation was supposed to 
pass on the losses to investors. However, when the 
subprime crisis hit, the complexity of contractual 
arrangements in the securitisation process and in 
derivatives markets, strongly interconnecting all the major 
banks and investment funds in the US and Europe, made it 
impossible to clearly assess the respective losses of each 
individual financial institution. Thus, by September 2008, 
an accumulation of inappropriate standards and practices 
used in the securitisation process led to a dramatic loss of 
confidence on global financial markets which brought 
them to a complete standstill.  
 
“Simple, Transparent and Standard Securitisation”: a 
step in the right direction, but doubts persist 
 
Against this backdrop, the regulatory puzzle faced by 
policymakers is how to revive this activity while correcting 
the pre-crisis malpractices and inadequate standards. The 
proposal put forward by the European Commission “laying 
down common rules on securitisation and creating a 
European framework for simple, transparent and 
standardised securitisation” (2015: 1) aims to create a label 
identifying safe securitisations and promoting it as a way to 
channel funding from capital markets to SMEs.  
 
The regulation under discussion includes a list of 55 criteria 
that a securitisation should comply with in order to qualify 
for the STS securitisation label. As the Commission stated 
in the introduction to its proposal: “The "STS standard" 
does not mean that the securitisation concerned is free of 
risks, but means that the product respects a number of 
criteria and that a prudent and diligent investor will be able 
to analyse the risk involved” (2015: 15). The criteria 
therefore aim at mitigating the risks arising from the 
process of securitisation itself such as modelling risk, 
agency risk and legal risk, allowing the investors to focus 
their assessment on the credit risk of the underlying assets. 
The purpose of this distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
securitisation is to introduce a sort of premium for 
engaging in STS securitisation, in the form of lower 
prudential capital requirements. In the discussion, 
however, some points of contention have emerged on 
these criteria. They are detailed below. 
 
Tranching 
 
The inclusion of tranching in the STS-compliant 
securitisation process has been criticised by civil society 
organisations, such as Finance Watch, and economists. 
They argue that tranching introduces extra complexity in 
the securitisation process and makes the risk assessment 
difficult for investors. Tranching refers to the creation of 
different classes of securities in the capital structure of the 
SPE, with different levels of seniority, the most senior 
tranches being less exposed to the underlying credit risk 
than the junior tranches. It allows the securities of the 
most senior tranches to get a better rating, higher than 
traditional unsecured debt securities and higher than the 
original pool of underlying assets, thus enlarging the pool 
of very safe assets in which institutional investors who are 
very risk-averse can place their funds. Yet, as Antoniades 
and Tarashev (2014: 37-38) have shown, tranching creates 
uncertainty for tranches in the middle of the structure: 
“mezzanine tranches would be subject to considerable 
uncertainty because of the so-called cliff effect: a small 
estimation error could mean that the risk of such a tranche 
is as low as that of a senior tranche or as high as that of a 
junior tranche.” If tranching is to be allowed, then  
additional safeguards are necessary in order to reduce the 
uncertainty or mitigate the potential risks attached 
specifically to mezzanine tranches.  
 
Synthetic securitisation  
 
In contrast to ‘true sale’ securitisations, the classic type of 
securitisation described above, in synthetic securitisation, 
the underlying assets – the loans – are not transferred 
from the bank’s balance sheet to the SPE’s balance sheet, 
only the credit risk is transferred. This is done through a 
guarantee or a derivative contract – e.g. a credit default 
swap (CDS) – sold by the SPE to the bank. Concretely, the 
SPE and the bank agree that if the credit risk materializes 
– borrowers do not repay their loans – the SPE will pay a 
certain amount to the bank as a compensation for the loss. 
In exchange, the bank pays a regular premium to the SPE, 
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which issues debt securities backed by this cash flow that 
it places to investors on capital markets to raise the money 
it needs to pay the bank in case of defaults on the loans.  
 
A transfer of assets can be a complicated operation on the 
legal side, and in some cases it can be impossible, notably 
for some loans to SMEs. Synthetic securitisations allow the 
risk transfer without requiring an actual transfer of assets. 
There are however two main issues with synthetic 
securitisation. First, instead of just taking the credit risk off 
the bank’s balance sheet, it replaces it with a new 
counterparty risk (the risk that the SPE does not have the 
funds to pay in case the CDS is activated). Second, the 
derivative contracts linking the parties can vary greatly in 
their conditions, introducing greater complexity in the 
operation. The European Commission had originally 
proposed to exclude – at least temporarily – synthetic 
securitisations from the STS standard, following the 
European Banking Authority (EBA)’s advice that there are 
currently no established criteria to assess the quality of 
these securitisations. However, in his draft report on the 
Commission’s proposal, the rapporteur for the European 
Parliament, Paul Tang, tabled amendments allowing their 
inclusion on the grounds that this technique allows the 
banks to manage their on-balance sheet risk more 
efficiently, thus freeing capital for other loans to the 
economy. 
 
Risk-retention: keeping incentives aligned 
 
The poor quality of the underlying assets has been one of 
the major sources of risk in pre-crisis securitisation. This 
securitisation of bad loans – the famous ‘subprime’ 
mortgages – has been related to what is called the 
‘originate-to-distribute’ model: issuing loans meant to be 
securitised with lower quality standards than the ones to 
be kept on the originator’s balance sheet. This model 
resulted in ‘cherry-picking’, with banks keeping the ‘safe’ 
loans on their books, and securitising the riskier ones. In 
that model, the incentives of the originator and those of 
the investors went in opposite directions: while investors 
were looking for safe investment opportunities, the banks 
were offering risky loans in bulk. The poor quality of these 
loans was hidden behind their sheer number and credit 
enhancement techniques.  
 
A partial solution has already been integrated in the 
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) of 2014 in the form 
of a requirement for the bank originator of a securitisation 
to retain on its book the riskier 5% of the securitisation, 
thus keeping some ‘skin in the game’ and absorbing the 
first losses on the pool of securitised assets. The 
Securitisation regulation introduces as part of the STS 
criteria the requirement that securitised loans should be 
underwritten following the same standards for risk 
assessment as those kept on the balance sheet.  
 
While these requirements are likely to promote higher 
underwriting standards for the loans banks issue and limit 
the credit risk related to underlying assets, some argue 
that the risk-retention rate should be higher than 5% for 
the banks’ incentives to be fully aligned with those of the 
investors. Finance Watch, as well as a group of 83 
economists, thus advocate for a retention rate of 20%. The 
EBA, however, argues that there is no evidence that higher 
rates of retention provide better results, and that a rate of 
5% allows STS securitisations to qualify for the prudential 
treatment for significant risk transfers.  
 
EU-level supervision: the unanswered question 
 
Regulation, however well-conceived, is rather useless 
without a proper enforcement mechanism. For 
securitisation, the proposed regulation leaves it to the 
national supervisors to monitor the respect of its 
provisions, including the 55 criteria for STS securitisations, 
and to sanction non-compliance. Uniform interpretation 
of the provisions and coordination of their 
implementation – which are paramount for the desired 
cross-border European securitisation market – is supposed 
to be provided by the ESMA. 
 
Necessary cross-sectorial supervision 
 
It is worth noting that not one, but three of the European 
Supervisory Authorities have been working on 
securitisation – the European Securities Markets Authority 
(ESMA), the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the EBA – reflecting the 
fact that securitisation closely links one of the core 
activities of commercial banking – issuing loans – to capital 
markets and institutional investors, among them 
insurance companies.  
 
In its proposal, the European Commission suggests that the 
three authorities work together on securitisation in the 
framework of their joint committee, a solution also used 
for the supervision of financial conglomerates. As a matter 
of fact, cross-sectorial work on this issue makes sense. Each 
of the three authorities covers more specifically a part of 
the process and a set of actors. Excluding one of them 
would probably lead to sub-optimal supervision structures. 
 
However, dividing the tasks between the three authorities 
might be difficult in practice: monitoring developments 
along the securitisation chain requires keeping a larger 
view of the system and monitoring all actors’ behaviour, 
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which will require extensive communication and 
coordination. 
 
Beyond coordination, the need for a single EU-level 
supervisor 
 
Véron and Wolff (2016: 133) consider that “the EU should 
enhance its system-wide surveillance (…) the surveillance 
of a more complex financial system in which the role of 
banks could gradually become less dominant implies new 
challenges, which call for an adequate infrastructure”. 
While it sought to reduce the role of bank intermediation 
in the European economy and give more space to capital 
markets funding, it is surprising that the plan for a CMU 
does not foresee any specific arrangement to strengthen 
supervision in this sector. 
 
It has been said that the institutional implications of the 
project for a CMU – a European securities market 
supervisor – had been kept for after the UK referendum  on 
EU membership, out of fear that they would reinforce the 
pro-Leave campaign. We could thus expect this question to 
come back on the agenda soon enough if the UK does 
indeed make use of Article 50 TEU and leaves the EU. 
However, this still seems highly unlikely: creating a new 
institution with strong competences would be a bold step 
that most governments would not advocate as long as 
there is no major crisis to resolve in relation to capital 
markets. And since the current narrative is that European 
securitisations, in contrast to US securitisations, performed 
well during the crisis the probability of a crisis is perceived 
as low and the existing infrastructure  deemed adequate.  
 
However, if the ultimate goal really is the development of 
an EU-wide market for securitisation, then more than 
mere coordination will probably be required. The current 
framework can design common templates, but what about 
assessing the quality of a securitisation that would 
aggregate loans issued in different countries? The 
development of such cross-border securitisation may 
require a far more uniform implementation than the 
current system allows. Even though it may not be the most 
pressing issue at this point, policymakers should keep the 
door open to further institutional upgrades in the medium 
term, transforming the ESMA into a fully-fledged 
European securities markets supervisor.  
 
A better allocation of capital in the European economy?  
 
If the legislator does manage to adopt a regulatory 
framework that is sufficiently clear for both issuers and 
investors to engage in the securitisation market, fully 
aware of and informed about the structural risks involved 
in the products and of the underlying credit risk, and if that 
supervision is efficiently coordinated so that there is no 
major discrepancy in supervisors’ interpretation of the 
rules, it could be argued that on a micro-economic level, 
all is well: only reliable borrowers obtain loans; banks 
securitise these loans in a simple manner, and include all 
the relevant information on the underlying exposures; 
investors place their money in assets that correspond to 
their own appetite or aversion for risk and make a financial 
gain through the interests on repayment.  
 
Yet even in that best-case scenario, there is absolutely no 
guarantee that the funding thus raised on capital markets 
will support sustainable output growth in the real 
economy. Indeed, the two main classes of securitised 
assets are residential mortgages (Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities, RMBSs) that constituted 59% of all new 
issuances at the end of 2013, according to the EBA report 
on securitization) and, far behind, loans to SMEs (8%). The 
reason behind the preference for RMBSs is clear: 
residential mortgages are generally more homogenous, 
and information is much easier to collect and process than 
for loans to SMEs, making the credit-risk assessment 
easier.  
 
Where the securitisation market for SMEs has been strong 
in recent years (i.e. Italy and Spain), banks have retained 
most of the securities thus created on their balance sheets 
and used them as eligible collateral for the ECB’s 
refinancing operations, in large part because of the low 
demand from investors for these products. Clearer and 
more transparent information on SME credit could help 
steer investors’ demand for securitised SME loans. 
However, considering that, by nature, loans to SMEs are 
diverse, difficult to standardise and costly to document, 
this funding channel would only make a difference for a 
limited number of larger SMEs.  
 
Bertay, Gong and Wagner (2015) have shown that this 
relatively easier securitisation process for loans to 
households results in a distortion of banks’ lending 
behaviour: banks prefer lending to households for housing 
and consumption rather than to firms for investment 
because they know they will be able to easily shift the 
loans off their balance sheet. And since there is only a 
finite quantity of capital to be allocated, more loans to 
households means less to SMEs. They conclude that the 
development of the securitisation market so far (their 
study covers the period from 1995 to 2012) has not 
increased funding for investment and capital formation by 
SMEs but to the contrary constrained the supply side of 
the economy in countries where securitisation has 
developed the most.  
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If one recalls that in the run-up to the global financial crisis 
in the US, but also in some European countries such as 
Ireland and Spain, investors’ demand for RMBS flooded 
money into the housing market, creating a credit and a 
real estate bubble, it may be argued that this path to 
economic growth has already proved unsustainable. While 
it injects capital on the demand side to boost economic 
output in the short run, the crisis has shown that it also 
leads to a lack of productive investments, which resulted 
in a loss of competitiveness in the peripheral members of 
the Eurozone.  
 
Securitisation probably is not the main factor explaining 
this lacklustre investment in the Eurozone periphery 
before the crisis, but it appears to be a contributing factor. 
There is thus no reason to expect securitisation to 
naturally allocate capital to firms, let alone SMEs. If the 
goal of the Securitisation regulation really is to allow a 
better allocation of capital to support innovative SMEs and 
a sustainable path to economic growth, then the class of 
underlying assets that are to be securitised should be a 
major concern: if capital does not naturally flow towards 
SMEs, it should be directed towards them.  
 
Beyond financial stability, focus on economic growth in 
the EU 
 
Any attempt to divert capital away from securitised loans 
to households and into securitised loans to SMEs would 
entail interfering with the way banks conduct their 
business, in the pursuit of a clearly oriented policy goal, 
beyond setting a mere ‘level-playing field’ between 
financial activities. 
 
In the current context of political turmoil and social unrest 
across Europe, the EU cannot afford another decade of 
sluggish economic growth and mass unemployment, nor 
another unsustainable credit bubble followed by a 
financial crisis. This conundrum should lead EU 
policymakers to search for a middle way: regulation should 
allow the revival of securitisation, since it currently 
appears to be one of the ways to channel funds from 
capital markets to the real economy, but only as long as it 
does fuel an innovation- and jobs-rich economic growth, 
not unsustainable asset bubbles. To ensure this, what is 
needed is a robust and clear legal framework eradicating 
the risks arising from the securitisation process itself. At 
the same time, it is necessary to establish a strong 
supervision of securities markets at EU-level, and entrust 
it with the necessary powers to make sure the funds go to 
the economic sectors which are actually in need of funding  
 
Without this broader outlook on the needs of the real 
economy, restoring the securitisation market may well 
miss the target and end up doing nothing more than 
helping banks restore their profitability – through the fees 
collected on issuance and servicing – without any 
significant advantage for society at large. 
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